Seifert v. Comm of PA Human by unknown
2008 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-9-2008 
Seifert v. Comm of PA Human 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 
Recommended Citation 
"Seifert v. Comm of PA Human" (2008). 2008 Decisions. 139. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/139 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 07-4202
_______________
MARILYN SEIFERT,
           Appellant, 
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION
           
_______________
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(No. 05-cv-00551)
District Judge:  Honorable Joy Flowers Conti
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 3, 2008
Before: FISHER, CHAGARES, and HARDIMAN Circuit Judges.
(Filed:   December 9, 2008)
_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
2CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
On April 11, 2002, Marilyn Seifert was terminated from her job at the Pittsburgh
office of the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission (PHRC).  On April 7, 2005, she
filed a complaint against the PHRC alleging that the termination was unlawful. 
Specifically, Seifert alleged that the PHRC fired her because she exercised her rights
under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654, to
take time off of work in order to care for her sick mother.  The District Court granted
summary judgment for the PHRC on the ground that Seifert’s complaint was untimely. 
Seifert appeals, and we will affirm, albeit for a different reason.
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly recite
the facts.
Seifert started working for the PHRC’s Pittsburgh office in 1992.  Shortly
thereafter, she was assigned the position of “leave clerk.”  This meant she was
responsible for ensuring that PHRC employees followed proper internal procedures for
taking sick leave, vacation leave, and any other time spent away from the office.  But,
ironically, Seifert’s tenure with the PHRC was defined by her own personal failure to
follow proper leave procedures.  Her supervisor, George Simmons (“Simmons”),
repeatedly reprimanded her for coming in late, leaving early, and taking unauthorized
absences throughout the day.  At one point, Simmons even shifted Seifert’s work
3schedule back one hour in order to make it easier for her to get to the office on time.
Simmons periodically complained to PHRC Human Resources (HR) about Seifert’s
punctuality and attendance issues.
In March 2001, Seifert requested a significant amount of time off — time to which
she was statutorily entitled under the FMLA — to care for her sick mother.  Simmons
allegedly tried to discourage her from taking time off.  Seifert claimed that Simmons
berated her about it and several times claimed he lost the paperwork required to process
the leave request.  Nevertheless, he ultimately approved the request.  However, Simmons
continued to complain to HR about Seifert’s failure to follow correct leave procedures. 
In late 2001, motivated by Simmons’s complaints, HR personnel began to inspect
Seifert’s timesheets for that year to determine whether she had accurately deducted her
leave time.  The investigation concluded that, although Seifert was entitled to the FMLA
leave she took to be with her mother, she may not have properly accounted for it (and for
other leave time) according to internal PHRC protocol.  HR administrators instructed
Simmons to keep a close eye on Seifert’s leave reporting from then on.  He did, and he
discovered that Seifert failed to submit a doctor’s note to cover medical leave taken in
March 2002.
On April 11, 2002, Seifert was terminated. Seifert’s termination letter cited her
chronic failure to account for her leave time as a ground for dismissal.
On April 7, 2005, Seifert filed the action that gave rise to this appeal.  She claimed
4that the PHRC fired her not because she failed to account for her FMLA leave according
to internal PHRC rules, but because she took the FMLA leave in the first place.  The
PHRC filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Seifert’s complaint was
untimely because she filed it after the two-year FMLA limitation period had expired.
Seifert contended that her claim was governed by the statute’s three-year limitation period
for “willful violations.”  The District Court disagreed, applied the two-year period, and
granted summary judgment.  Seifert then filed this appeal.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and
we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The FMLA gives certain employees the right to take up to 12 weeks off during a
12-month period “[i]n order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the
employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition.”  29
U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).  Federal regulations prohibit an employer from retaliating against
an employee for taking advantage of FMLA leave.  29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c).
An aggrieved employee has two years from the date of the last retaliatory act in
which to file a complaint.  29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1).  However, an employee alleging a
“willful” violation is given three years in which to file.  29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(2).
In opposing summary judgment before the District Court, Seifert argued that the
PHRC’s violation was willful because, when Seifert requested FMLA leave, Simmons (1)
5acted hostilely towards Seifert, (2) tried to prevent Seifert from taking FMLA leave by
claiming to have lost the required paperwork, (3) refused to grant a later leave request,
and (4) exaggerated the extent of Seifert’s insubordination in communications with HR in
order to get her fired.  Pl.’s Resp. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 12-13 (arguing why her
claim alleged a “willful” violation); Seifert v. PHRC, 515 F. Supp. 2d 601, 614-16 (W.D.
Pa. 2005) (opinion granting summary judgment for PHRC) (enumerating Seifert’s
willfulness arguments).  In this appeal, however, Seifert seems to abandon these
arguments in favor of two new ones.  Now, Seifert contends that a genuine issue of
material fact as to willfulness exists because the PHRC (1) fired her before first
suspending her, contrary to its progressive discipline policy, and (2) had a heightened
awareness of the conduct prohibited by the FMLA, given that the PHRC’s mission
includes preserving employees’ rights.  Appellant’s Br. at 9-18.
Generally, only arguments made first to the District Court may be heard on appeal
in support of reversal.  See Flick v. Borg-Warner Corp., 892 F.2d 285, 288 (3d Cir. 1990)
(refusing to consider appellant’s argument — not raised in district court — in support of
reversing grant of summary judgment).  Mere allusion or reference is not enough; the
issue must actually be raised with a minimum level of thoroughness.  Delaware Nation v.
Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting it is not enough to mention
relevant facts without explaining how they relate to the argument); Brennan v. Norton,
350 F.3d 399, 419 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting it is not enough simply to invoke name of
6potentially relevant case).  If an argument was not made to the District Court, we may
consider it only if not doing so would result in a grave injustice or would jeopardize a
significant public interest.  See, e.g., Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67, 69-70
(3d Cir. 1983) (affirming and holding argument concerning proper rule of construction
applicable to every Pennsylvania resident’s homeowner insurance policy did not
jeopardize a significant public interest); Princeton Cmty. Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582
F.2d 706, 708 n.1 (3d Cir. 1978) (affirming and holding argument made for first time on
appeal that could not have been made to district court because law changed between date
of district court’s judgment and date of appeal did not constitute manifest injustice).
In her response in opposition to the PHRC’s motion for summary judgment, Seifert
never mentioned (much less meaningfully discussed) the PHRC’s progressive discipline
policy or allegedly heightened knowledge of the FMLA.  Moreover, she never filed a
reply brief in conjunction with this appeal attempting to rebut the PHRC’s contention that
these arguments were not made to the District Court.
Further, refusing to consider these arguments now would not cause a manifest
injustice or jeopardize a significant public interest.  As to manifest injustice, we can find
no justification — and Seifert has not attempted to bring one to our attention — for
Seifert’s failure to mention these two purported bases for willfulness in her response in
opposition to the PHRC’s motion for summary judgment.  Seifert does not argue that she
did not have access to the factual matter underlying these arguments before the deadline
7for opposing summary judgment.  Indeed, fact discovery closed more than two months
before Seifert filed her response.  Simply put, Seifert had enough information to make
these arguments in her opposition to the PHRC’s motion, but did not.  Therefore,
precluding them here would not generate a manifest injustice.  See, e.g., Continental Cas.
Co. v. Dominick D’Andrea, Inc., 150 F.3d 245, 253 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding no manifest
injustice where appellant was unable to explain failure to raise argument in district court);
Altman v. Altman, 653 F.2d 755, 758 (3d Cir. 1981) (same).
As to public interest, this action does not involve a question of law critically
relevant to a large or significant group.  Rather, it involves the application of an intensely
fact-bound standard (“willfulness”) to the circumstances surrounding the termination of
one employee.  See Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n, 168 F.3d 661, 671 n.9 (3d Cir. 1999)
(holding fact-dependent argument in employment discrimination case does not implicate
the raise-or-waive rule’s public-policy exception).  And again, Seifert has not attempted
to prove otherwise.
III.
Seifert’s arguments on appeal supporting the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to willfulness were not made to the District Court in the first
instance.  Further, refusing to consider those arguments now would not cause manifest
 For the sake of completeness, we note that we find no substantive merit in the1
willfulness arguments made to the District Court and apparently abandoned on appeal.
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injustice or jeopardize a significant public interest.   Therefore, we will affirm the District1
Court’s grant of summary judgment for the PHRC.
